Social Movement Theory and Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts

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Introduction

Searching for a satisfactory description of empirical cases of cyberconflict (conflict in computer mediated environments) led to the use of a classification between two types of cyberconflict: sociopolitical and ethnoreligious.¹ In order to explain the empirical evidence of ‘cyberconflict’, I propose the integration of elements of social movement, conflict and media theories to a single analytical framework for cyberconflict. This paper however, is preoccupied with sociopolitical cyberconflicts, looking mainly at social movement theory as an explanatory platform to engage with these conflicts. Firstly, I introduce a definition and an example of sociopolitical cyberconflict. Secondly, I examine the mobilising structures (the network-style structure of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), framing processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of the internet on these processes) and the media (and the internet particularly) as a component of the political opportunity structure. In the conclusion, I single out which of the variables mentioned in the proposed integrated theoretical framework can be applied to the 2003 anti-Iraq war protests. Media theory is only mentioned here as a parameter of the framework without delving deeper, partly because I have done so elsewhere and most importantly, because the paper aims at addressing social movements’ use of the internet as a political resource.

Sociopolitical Cyberconflicts

Sociopolitical cyberconflicts or netwar conflicts can be placed into two broad groups, either those who are primarily concerned with global issues such as the environment, issues for which the level of negotiation with governments is open for debate, and those groups who are much less inclined to negotiate with governments, being as they are concerned with issues such as their own liberation from the control of the state.² One aspect of the problem seems to be that with the explosion of the size of the internet, protests and political activism have entered a new realm. Political activism on the internet has generated a wide range of activity such as using e-mail and web sites to organize, to web defacements and denial-of-service attacks, described above. These politically motivated attacks are called hacktivism. Sociopolitical cyberconflict could be seen as taking two forms: one when proper hackers attack virtually chosen political targets and secondly, when persons organise through the internet to protest or carry through e-mail a political message.

There is a debate between hacktivists concerning denial of service attacks and web defacements. On the one side there are those who find that such actions run contrary to other people’s right to freedom of speech and those who view these actions as the only way to get the public’s attention. The fact is that web defacements cannot be dismissed as electronic graffiti and denial of service attacks as nuisances, because there is concern by online companies that it could affect share prices, earning and cause damage to reputation and customer confidence. Indeed this is the reason why there should be more analysis on the reasoning underpinning hacktivism and its political rationale.

An example of mass action hacktivism would be the Seattle anti-World Trade Organisation protests at the end of November 1999, which were the first to take full advantage of the alternative media network via the internet. Protestors used cellphones, direct transmissions from independent media feeding directly onto the internet, personal computers with wireless modems broadcasting live video, and a variety of other network communications. The anti-WTO protesters were able to initiate a newsworthy event, putting the other side to the defensive. Using the internet they could send stories directly from the street for the whole world to see, rendering the information uncontrollable. Thirdly, they were able to mobilise support by promoting an alternative frame for the event.

On the down side, the epic qualities of the best demonstrations, both in terms of size and drama, are lost in cyberspace. While mass action hacktivism can clearly be symbolic actions, and it can draw large numbers of people together to protest, some of the qualities of a symbolic demonstration are lost.3 However, “online protests have the advantage of being able to pass a great amount of information, in forms that mean people can take a little and explore a lot. In non-virtual spaces it is difficult to hand over more than a leaflet, even if volumes could be devoted on the particular cause”.4 As Taylor and Jordan argue, in the overarching context of viral times, and born both from hacking and from the anti-globalisation movement of the twenty-first century, hacktivism is perhaps the first, widespread social and political movement of the new millennium.5

**Social Movement Theory**

For the purpose of this analysis, I will use three broad sets of factors in analysing the emergence and developments of social movements: (1) the structure of political opportunities and constrains confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organisation (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.6

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6 McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings*, Cambridge University Press:
The focus would be on the mobilising structures (the network-style structure of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), framing processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of the internet on these processes) and the media (and the internet particularly) as a component of the political opportunity structure.

**Mobilising structures**

The classical RMT model is used to understand as McCarthy puts it:

how mobilising structural forms emerge and evolve; how they are chosen, combined, and adapted by social movement activists; and how they differently affect particular movements as well as movement cycle trajectories. The concepts of political opportunity and strategic framing are, I believe, particularly useful in illuminating these processes.\(^7\)

Furthermore, according to Tarrow, people engage in contentious politics:

when patterns of political opportunities and constraints change and then, by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, create new opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages in society, when they bring people together around inherited cultural symbols, and when they can build on or construct dense social networks and connective structures, then these episodes of contention result in sustained interactions with opponents – specifically, in social movements.\(^8\)

In a very restrictive sense, a social movement consists of two kinds of components: (1) networks of groups and organizations prepared to mobilise for protest actions to promote (or resist) social change (which is the ultimate goal of social movements); and (2) individuals who attend protest activities or contribute resources without necessarily being attached to movement groups or organisations.

One of the most important components of resource mobilisation theory is mobilisation. Mobilisation is the process of creating movement structures and preparing and carrying out protest actions which are visible movement ‘products’

\(^7\) McCarthy, J: ‘Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting and inventing’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.141

addressed to actors and publics outside the movement. It implies a process by which an actor augments its resources through gaining the support of other actors or a process by which those that have not taken an active part in politics are drawn into it.

As Brown explains:

In evaluating the impact of mobilizations it is necessary to distinguish three levels of outcome. Firstly, the success or failure in gaining the support of potential supporters, secondly, success or failure in modifying the position of those that the mobilization is targeted against and thirdly, the impact on the prospects for future mobilizations.

In terms of the mobilisational structure, NSMs are open decentralized, nonhierarchical/ideal for internetted communication. Melucci characterizes the new social movements as

segmented, polucephalic structures. The movement is composed by diverse, autonomous units that expend an important part of their resources on internal solidarity. A network of communication and exchange keeps the cells in contact with each other. Information, persons and models of behaviour circulate in the network, moving from one unit to another and thus promoting a certain homogeneity of the whole structure. Leadership is not concentrated but diffuse...

We assume that the internet is used particularly by two kinds of movements structures: (a) informal networks with a large geographical reach, and (b) big powerful and more centralized social movement organizations. Moreover, the internet appears to play an especially crucial role in issue-focused, transnational campaigns.

Using again the Independent Media Center example, the IMC network is based on a non hierarchical structure that relies on highly complex processes of networked consensus:

International meetings are held online. There are a wide array of listserv discussion groups that range from general discussions to finances to translation and technical issues. Meetings are conducted through highly complex processes of decision-making, using a consensus model drawn from the direct action wing of the anti-globalisation movement.

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9 Rucht, D: ‘The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement and cross-national comparison’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 186
10 Brown, R: Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political Communications and Transnational Political Strategy, American Political Science Association Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p.2
11 Brown, R: Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political Communications and Transnational Political Strategy, American Political Science Association Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p.5
According to Tormey, the internet represents an activism based on networks of self-avowed minorities, rather than on classic models of political organisation. Those who wish to ‘speak’ can do so unmediated by the needs and interests of perhaps distant leadership intent on sending the ‘right’ signals to the electorate, to powerful states or global institutions. As Tormey puts it:

Networks can be extended indefinitely and in more than one or two dimensions. There is no ‘membership’ as such, just engagement. There is no brake, organisational, fiscal, or ideological on joining merely access to the network. Networks facilitate temporary alliances, coalitions, agreements, events, interactions. A network consists of chains of allegiance and intersection or what are sometimes called ‘nodal points’; where there is convergence for the purpose of acting in support of some group or cause. (his italics)  

But is it unthinkable that political parties using ICTs to redesign themselves into a more ‘social movement’ – like type of organization, or that social movements are using them to compete with political parties? ICTs might perhaps not profoundly change the very ‘logic’ of collective action, but they seem to change, in any case the structure of political communication and mobilisation.  

Political organizations that are older, larger, resource-rich, and strategically linked to party and government politics may rely on internet-based communications mostly to amplify and reduce the costs of pre-existing communication routines. On the other hand, newer, resource-poor organisations that tend to reject conventional politics may be defined in important ways by their internet presence. ICTs, can be effectively used to build and maintain powerful and centralised organisations, but empirical evidence also suggests that ICTs can be effective tools to establish and run decentralised networks that allow those who are technically linked to air their views, and, if needed, to mobilise a virtual or physical community of activists.

Some websites are also products of spectacular alliances between NGOs, culture-jammers, small groups of activists, opinion leaders, or just ordinary citizens with the skills and credibility to succeed in the attention game on the world wide web: ‘This could be called network politics – a process in which people, organizations, and groups are included not because of formal status, but because they have specific resources needed in the process’. In addition, conventional print media produced by the transnational movements (TMs), e.g newsletters, newspapers, and magazines,

appear to be of less importance than for the NSMs. Instead, the use of electronic communication, in particular the internet, plays a crucial role for TMs and, to a growing extent, contemporary NSMs as well.\textsuperscript{20}

Furthermore, the cycle of protests argument states that NSM are simply recent manifestations of a cyclical pattern of social movements.\textsuperscript{21} Some link the cycles to anti-modern or romantic-ideological reactions to the contradictory and alienating effects of modern societies, others to recurring waves of cultural criticism linked to changes in the cultural climate or to political and social events. Movements change in response to shifts in local or national political opportunities, available resources, the actions of counter-movements, state change in strategy, public opinion.\textsuperscript{22} Minkoff argues that ‘trajectories of protest cycles are jointly determined by increases in the rates of protest and increases in the density of social movement organisation’.\textsuperscript{23} It may be argued that the internet accelerates protest circles and generally makes it far easier to organise protest than used to be the case in the past.

Moreover, key issues to focus on when analysing NSMs are ideology, goals, tactics, participants, recruitment, entry, movement phase, influence, self-label, distinguishing characteristics, key issues, key organisations:

New social movements call into question the structures of representative democracies that limit citizen input and participation in governance, instead advocating direct democracy, self-help groups, and cooperative styles of social organisation. Taken together the values of NSMs center on autonomy and identity.\textsuperscript{24}

Issues of participation and recruitment are very important and briefly three points should be taken into consideration as outlined by Snow, Zurcher and Olson\textsuperscript{25}: the fewer and weaker the social ties to alternative networks, the greater the structural availability for movement participation; the greater the availability for participation the greater the probability of accepting recruitment invitation; movements which are linked to other groups expand in a more rapid rate that more isolated and closed ones. This has been clearly observed with the anti-globalisation and the peace movement. The NSMs have taken to making good use of the greater participation offered on the Internet, as well as the numerous links, cyberlinks or otherwise, translated into social links and ties. The NSMs use the internet to support external activity, they may work

\textsuperscript{22} Kriesi et al 1995, Tarrow 1994, Tilly 1995
within the internet to create a foundation for their activities, and they have attempted to influence policy affecting the internet.\textsuperscript{26}

There is also a distinction between defensive/offensive types of movements. Contemporary movements combine features of both. They are defensive in that they ‘defend spaces for the creations of new identities and solidarities’ and offensive in that ‘they involve conflict between social adversaries over the control of a social field’.\textsuperscript{27} Here it could be argued that groups in ethnoreligious cyberconflicts are more of an offensive type of movements, in contrast to the more mixed (defensive and offensive) character of groups in sociopolitical cyberconflicts.

A very interesting theoretical synthesis: Touraine moves on to two analytical levels: looking at the structural and cultural dimension of contemporary society and the conflictual processes of identity formation of collective actors. He identifies these key elements: pursuit of collective interests, reconstruction of a social, cultural and political identity, changing the rules of the game, defense of a status or privileges, national conflicts, neocommunitarian.\textsuperscript{28} Following Touraine, it could be argued here that groups in sociopolitical cyberconflicts pursue collective interests, which relate to a reconstruction of a social, cultural and political identity. Evidence of this is found in the use of the internet by groups in the anti-globalisation and the anti-war movements.

As far as tactics (or modes of action-internal/external) are concerned these include mobilising supporters, neutralising supporters and or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers. Briefly, tactics are influenced internally by organisational competition and cooperation and externally by public opinion and the state. Since societies provide the infrastructure for movement industries it depends on the affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting networks and occupational growth how these tactics develop.\textsuperscript{29} Also, important are their professional or communicative skills, which enable them to participate in the process of identity building. Evidently, information transmitted by successful insurgencies becomes the key indicator of political opportunity for emerging movements and drives the development of broad-based protest cycles.\textsuperscript{30} On the internet, social movement groups are able to communicate, to generate information and to distribute this information cheaply and effectively, allowing response and feedback:

This is in large part because of its structure as a decentralised, textual communications system, the content of which has traditionally been provided by users. Again, such

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characteristics accord with the requisite features of NSMs: nonhierarchical, open protocols; open communication; and self-generating information and identities.31

It is equally important to note here, as Bennet does, that it is not so much the internet as the network structures established through it: ‘uses of the internet may have important effects on organisational structures, both inside member organisations and in terms of overall network stability and capacity’.32 Studies have highlighted two functions of the net: first, it helps communication in information dissemination, formal networking, and action coordination; second, it helps in building a collective identity among participants and potential participants of the movement.33 This raises the broader question: Have the new forms of communication, in this case, changed the ‘logic of collective action’ or just the speed of protest diffusion?34

The internet delivers significant services to movements: information dissemination and information retrieval, recruitment, mobilisation, soliciting opinions, opinion polling, discussion, facilitating contacts between he organisation’s members, service, networking, communication and coordination with other organizations.35 As le Grignou and Patou argue one can see that the internet is an important tool in terms of the diffusion of protest and the consistency of protest, in order to achieve a ‘consensual mobilisation’.36 Thus, the internet contributes to three different elements that establish movement formation: a shared definition of the problem as a basis for collective identity, actual mobilisation of participants, and a network of different organizations.37 For example, during the 1999 anti-WTO campaign: While groups with local ties concentrated on mobilisation and direct action, more transnationally based groups provided information and frames to feed the action.38

Mobilisation has been argued to be one of the crucial elements in the movements’ organisation, incorporating the impact of technology on these movements. To the extent that Robin Brown emphasises its importance this way: ‘Indeed it may be more profitable to analyse the impact of information and communication technologies

36 ibid., p. 171
38 ibid., p. 101
(ICTs) in terms of mobilization rather than in the more sweeping terms offered by ideas such as cyberpolitik or netwar’.39 Two key arguments support his conviction: Mobilisation cuts across the distinction between material and ideational factors and mobilisation keeps the technological issue firmly embedded in a social and political context.40

Not surprisingly for instance, websites are action mobilisators. According to Edwards’ research on the Dutch women’s movement online, first, the emphasis is on external information provision. The ‘first generation’ websites contain the basic (static) information about the organization. Then, organizations expand their websites so as to include more information: background information on the problem area that they address, as well as dynamic information about their activities. Subsequently, organisations develop their ambitions further, and these are more focused using network technology for internal communication purposes. Next, organisations start to develop more advanced interactive functions of the internet in their communication with the environment.41 However, as van Aelst and Walgrave argue, most sites offer the ‘basics’, such as feedback possibility or a newsletter, mostly via email. More sophisticated ways of interaction and debate such as forums or chat rooms are limited.42 An illuminating aspect to their argument is that the concept of mobilisation should be extended ‘from (former) “unconventional” street actions such as demonstrations and sit-ins to new virtual actions varying from an online petition to pinning down the enemy’s server’.43 Costanza-Chock, a community arts activist, has a similar opinion: ‘you have all these people collectively mobilizing, engaging in action together, telling their friends, discussing what’s happening, taking heart that they’re not alone in what they feel is a struggle against injustice. So you have the movement-building elements’.44

The conclusion is that the internet is reshaping the organisational infrastructure of the movements that use it at least in three ways: mobilisation of resources, maintaining relations with the environment and management of frames. However, as Edwards argues in relation to the Dutch women’s movement: ‘The impact is most visible in the movement’s increased capacity for mobilizing resources. To a lesser extent, there are also effects in the management of frames…However, the interactive functions on the

39 Brown, R: ‘Mobilizing the Bias of Communication: Information Technology, Political Communications and Transnational Political Strategy’, American Political Science Association Convention, Washington DC, 30 August- 3 September 2000, p.2
43 ibid., p. 114
websites of organizations in the physical domain are still in their infancy’.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed below we shall consider the effect of the internet on the framing process.

\textit{Framing process: Identity, issue, strategy.}

Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behaviour and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action. Symbols, frames, and ideologies are created and changed in the process of contestation.\textsuperscript{46}

The management of frames is a crucial element of collective action and mobilisation: ‘…building a movement around strong ties of collective identity, whether inherited or constructed, does much of the work that would normally fall to organization; but it cannot do the work of mobilization, which depends on framing identities so that they will lead to action, alliances, interaction’.\textsuperscript{47}

Similarly, McAdam argues that the concept of framing is an important and a necessary corrective to those broader structural theories, which often depict social movements as the inevitable byproducts of expanding political opportunities (political process), emerging system-level contradictions or dislocations (some version of new social movement theory) or newly available resources (resource mobilisation).\textsuperscript{48}

If we consider the concept of ‘repertoires of collective action’ introduced by Tarrow, action is shaped by and coordinated through the development of those models or scripts shared within a particular society at a particular historical juncture. As a resource, the presence of shared goals models facilitates mobilisation.\textsuperscript{49} This leads us to what the framing process involves: (1) the cultural tool kits available to would be insurgents; (2) the strategic framing efforts of movement groups; (3) the frame


\textsuperscript{46} Zald, M: ‘Culture, ideology and strategic framing’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 262


\textsuperscript{48} McAdam, D: ‘The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the American civil rights movement’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.339

\textsuperscript{49} Clemens, E: ‘Organizational form as frame: Collective identity and political strategy in the American labor movement, 1880-1920’, in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 211
contests between movement and other collective actors – principally the state, and countermovement groups; (4) the structure and role of the media in mediating such contests; and (5) the cultural impact of the movement in modifying the available toolkit.\(^{50}\)

More specifically, through ‘frame bridging’, ‘frame amplification’ and ‘frame extension’, movements link existing cultural frames to a particular issue or problem, clarify and invigorate a frame that bears on a particular issue or problem, and expand the boundaries of a movement’s primary framework to encompass broader interests or points of view. The most ambitious strategy is the fourth ‘frame transformation’, framing device for movements that seek substantial social change.\(^{51}\)

According to Zald, social movements draw on the cultural stock of how to protest and how to organise. Templates of organisation include skills and technology of communication (e.g. writing newsletters, running meetings), of fund raising, of running an office, of recruiting members. Repertoires of contention include building barricades, organising marches, nonviolent disruption, and the like. Templates of organisation may be drawn from the whole society, while repertoires of contention are available from the whole social movements sector.\(^{52}\)

The dilemma concerning two of the three elements of framing (strategy, identity, issue) is the strategy or identity one, as identified by Cohen. In the homonymous paper, he cites Touraine’s argument that the exclusive orientations to identity and to strategy are the opposite sides of the same coin, in that they both look at social conflicts in terms of the response to long term changes (modernisation) rather than in relational terms of social structure. From such a standpoint, ‘society’ is stratified in terms of the actor’s ability (power and privilege) to adapt to change successfully (elites), their success in securing protection from change (operatives) or the victimisation by change (marginalised masses).\(^{53}\)

In terms of issues, NSMs engage with different types of issues like quality of life issues/redistributive issues/ movements that oppose present social life/movements that challenge modern state domination. Value shift hypothesis: NSMs stress issues of identity participation and quality of life rather than economic matters. This however may not be necessarily so, as the anti-globalisation/anti-capitalist movement have shown. The internet connection here is that the rise of technology could possibly have altering effects. One example is that maybe there is a link of the globality of computer networks with the globality of protest. Another indication is that the internet itself

\(^{50}\) McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.19


\(^{52}\) Zald, M: ‘Culture, ideology and strategic framing’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 267

challenges state boundaries and sovereignty and dissident groups use it against governments to that effect. As Kahn and Kellner argue:

Thus, while emergent mobile technology provides yet another impetus towards experimental identity construction and politics, such networking also links diverse communities such as labor, feminist, ecological, peace, and various anti-capitalist groups, providing the basis for a new politics for alliance and solidarity to overcome the limitations of postmodern identity politics.54

According to Whittier and Taylor collective identity consists of three related processes: delineation of group boundaries, construction of an oppositional consciousness or interpretative frameworks for understanding the world in a political light, and politicisation of everyday life.55 Another description of the process is formulating cognitive frameworks concerning the goals, means and environment of action, activating relationships among the actors and making emotional investments, which enable individuals to recognize themselves in each other.56 Also, the category of collective interest requires prior analysis of ‘what counts as collective advantage and how collective interests are recognized, interpreted, and able to command loyalty and commitment.’57 Cohen argues that it is incumbent on the theorist to look into the processes by which collective actors create the identities and solidarities they defend.58 This means that the logic of collective interaction entails something other than strategic or instrumental rationality. Pizzorno with a pure identity model for instance, argues that cost-benefit calculations cannot explain the collective action of new groups seeking identity, autonomy and recognition. An extended version of that would be to say that ‘collective actors strive to create a group identity within a general social identity whose interpretation they contest.’59 New social movements use sharp antinomies to build up this identity like yes/no, them/us, victory and defeat, now or never, which hardly allows for political exchange or gradualist tactics and even more striking is that they do not rely for their self-identification on either the established political codes (left/right, liberal/conservative, etc) nor on socioeconomic codes (working class/middle class, poor/wealthy, rural/urban population).60 An interesting study on collective identity by McKenna and Bargh61 discusses the idea that Usenet groups provide a place for marginalised persons to communicate with others, thus increasing one’s self-esteem. Their theory hypothesizes that group membership is incorporated into the self, so that the individual will feel as a member of the group. As

58 ibid., p.690.
59 ibid., p.694.
Myers explains their conclusion is that virtual group identities are just as important to the self as face to face group participation, and that respondents felt and identified with the people within the Usenet group: ‘To identify common themes, opportunities and potential drawbacks in the integration of ICTs into the communication repertoire of social movements’.

Moreover, Touraine argues NSMs have an increasingly temporary and symbolic function, fighting for symbolic and cultural stakes for a different meaning and orientation of social action. This could be especially true in collective actions taken in cyberspace where symbolic is the key function. This is why the concept of movement itself becomes increasingly inadequate and one has to give attention to Touraine’s preference to speak of movement networks or movement areas, as the network of groups and individuals sharing a conflictual culture and a collective identity. These networks allow multiple membership and personal involvement and effective solidarity is a condition for participation. This though is ‘not a temporary phenomenon, but a morphological shift in the structure of collective action.’

Furthermore, the form of the movement itself is a message, a symbolic challenge to the dominant patterns. The structure of NSMs outlined previously by Melucci and Touraine is the basis for internal collective identity, but also for a symbolic confrontation with the system: ‘It makes apparatuses to produce justifications, it pushes them to reveal their logic and the weakness of their reasons. It makes power visible’.

Due to the fact that frames are transmitted and reframed by the mass media, and consequently the internet, it has been argued that ‘the internet can function as a new medium to expose frames and problem definitions and as a space to create shared meaning and identities among the membership and the constituency’. Pini, Brown and Previte, for instance note how new configurations in computer-mediated communication lead to new patterns and possibilities and foster new coalitions of ideas/identities/frames that challenge existing ones in the ‘real’ world. I will be looking at the triangle between framing, political opportunity structure-the media and particularly the internet below.

The political opportunity structure: The media- the internet

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64 Touraine, pp. 798-800
65 ibid., p.800, cites Gerlach and Hine’s work People, Power and Change, 1970
66 ibid., p.813.
Any attempt at examining this relationship should include the issues of media sensitivity and event density. The press is more likely to report protest events that are more violent, involve more people and persist longer. The key event characteristics they identify are size, violence and duration collectively designated as event density. Moreover, researchers have to rely largely on practitioners from another profession, reporters, editors, publishers who make the decisions on which version of experience will ultimately be available for research purposes. Normally the media provide information on the actors who disagree, but much less information on what they disagree about.

Also, movements as it is commonly known have to walk the fine line between extreme forms of action, which alienates third parties, but secures coverage and coventionality, which however persuasive is ignored by the media. In effect, radical reform groups must master the art of simultaneously playing to a variety of publics, threatening opponents, and pressuring the state, all the while appearing non threatening and sympathetic to the media and other publics. This has been a major concern for groups in sociopolitical cyberconflicts, where symbolic hacking, while drawing media attention, nevertheless deprives the other side means of expression and invites counter-response. Social movements and mass media have several features in common: they are engaged in a struggle for attention; they want to maximise their outreach; they are confronted, though to different degrees with competitors. Nevertheless, they not only follow a different functional logic but also have a strikingly asymmetric relationship when dealing with each other. This becomes clear when we consider the structural positions of the movements offering conflict, spectacle, surprise, threat, etc, on the one hand and the media (potentially) granting coverage, importance, sympathy, etc, on the other hand. In a nutshell, this asymmetry stems from the fact that most movements need the media, but the media seldom need the movements.

Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986) indicate that the media are instrumental for social movements in at least three different ways: (1) media are important means of reaching the general public, to acquire approval and to mobilise potential participants; (2)

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71 Klandermans, B and Goslinga, S: ‘Media discourse, movement publicity, and the generation of collective action frames: Theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning construction’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 336
72 McAdam, D: ‘The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the American civil rights movement’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.344
media can link movements with other political and social actors; and (3) media can provide psychological support for social movements.34

The media spotlight validates the movement as an important player. This suggests that the opening and closing of media access and attention is a crucial element in defining political opportunity for movements.75 The media are another component of political opportunity structure that have both structural and dynamic elements. The media system’s openness to social movements is itself an important element of political opportunity. On the one hand, the media play an important role in the construction of meaning and the reproduction of culture. On the other hand, the media are also a site or arena in which symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors of meaning including movements.76 Its role as a validator for the larger society about whose views need to be taken seriously makes it crucial target for movement efforts to open political space. The media system operates to favor extra-institutional actors in some ways and institutional actors in others.77

The most interesting question is whether traditional media have been sidelined by the alternative media of the internet. For example, ICTs could improve a movement’s capacity to act in a coordinated and coherent way, to react more quickly to an external challenge, and to become less dependent on the established mass media in conveying their messages to a broader audience.78 However, Rucht argues that the net relativised, but did not replace, the traditional means of both internal and external communication of the movements.79

The effect of the internet (as part of the political opportunity structure) on the framing process is in fact a striking one. In terms of framing, the groups that use the internet have been innovative in both issues of identity and strategy, but also framing the issue itself: ‘The internet makes visible the fragmented plurality of its action by listing together subjects and causes…it simultaneously makes homogenous and coherent a set of analyses, activities and movements which otherwise be scattered’.80

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34 Klandermans, B and Goslinga, S: ‘Media discourse, movement publicity, and the generation of collective action frames: Theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning construction’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.319

75 Gamson, W and Meyer, D: (1996) ‘Framing political opportunity’ in McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.285

76 ibid., p.287

77 McAdam, D, McCarthy, J and Zald, M (eds.): Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Structural Framings, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.289


emergence of global justice movements that closely link a number of issues such as human rights, social rights, poverty and environmental issues has been greatly facilitated by the use of ICTs.

In strategic terms, the epic qualities of the best demonstrations, both in terms of size and drama, are lost in cyberspace: 'While mass action hacktivism can clearly be symbolic actions, and it can draw large numbers of people together to protest, some of the qualities of a symbolic demonstration are lost'. 81 On the other hand, online protests have the advantage of being able to pass a great amount of information, in forms that mean people can take a little and explore a lot. In non-virtual spaces it is difficult to hand over more than a leaflet, even if volumes could be devoted to the particular cause. 82

In identity terms, Nip for example found the participants on the Queer Sisters bulletin board developed a sense of solidarity with the Queer Sisters and shared a culture of opposition to the dominant order, but they fell short of harbouring a collective consciousness. 83 This could be explained perhaps by the difficulty in building collective trust in cyberspace. Or as Wright argues: ‘ICTs have sometimes played a dramatic role in communicating rich, multiple impressions of particular events as they unfold, but they have been used less successfully in promoting a coherent, collective assessment of what these events mean within the overall process of social change.’ 84

At the final analysis, the internet could improve a movement’s capacity to act in a coordinated and coherent way, to react more quickly to an external challenge, and to become less dependent on the established mass media in conveying their messages to a broader audience. The most extreme version of this argument is Diebert’s who stresses that the role of the internet went beyond facilitating activism already in place; rather it helped create ‘a new formation on the world political landscape’. 85

This section looked at key elements of social movement theory, which can help us with our analysis of sociopolitical cyberconflicts. The key issues analysed here are the mobilising structures (the network-style structure of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), framing processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of the internet on these processes) and the media (and the internet particularly) as a component of the political opportunity structure. This extensive discussion and analysis of central elements of social movement theory is going to prove useful when looking at new social movements and their use of the internet.

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82 ibid., p.80
Conclusion

My proposed integrated analytical framework urges us to focus on the following parameters when looking at sociopolitical cyberconflicts: (I will use the 2003 peace movement against the war in Iraq as an example of sociopolitical cyberconflict):

In analysing the March 2003 Iraq conflict, I looked at the Internet’s role in the conflict: its effect on the organisation and spread of the movement, its impact on war coverage and war-related cyberconflicts. These last involved hacking between anti-war and pro-war hacktivists (sociopolitical CC), but also between pro-Islamic, anti-Islamic hackers (ethnoreligious CC). On the effect on the organisation of the peace movement, anti war groups used e-mails lists and web sites, group text messages and chat rooms to organise protests making politics more accessible to an unprecedented number of people of all backgrounds that normally would not or could not get involved, while protests went international with protestors participating in 32 countries. Here too, the internet has become more than an organising tool, changing protests by allowing mobilisation to emerge from free-willing amorphous groups, rather than top-down hierarchies. On the effect on coverage we witnessed the following developments: Americans, as well as the rest of the world searched online for news they could not get at home, the full integration of the Internet into mainstream media, the effect of online material challenging official government sources and mainstream media, US’s bombastic relationship with the media, American media following mostly the government and the potential for first-hand witness accounts via e-mail and blogging. Lastly, on the impact on the Internet through cyberattacks, experts said at the time that they never seen that level of political activism before nor so many defacements in such a short time.

1. The sociopolitical impact of ICTs on:

   a. Mobilising structures (network style of movements using the internet, participation, recruitment, tactics, goals), b. Framing Processes (issues, strategy, identity, the effect of the internet on these processes), c. Political opportunity structure (the internet as a component of this structure), d. Hacktivism.

In the anti-Iraq war protests in February 2003, if we look for instance at the mobilisation structures (1a) they were greatly affected by the internet, the peace groups were organising demonstrations and events through the internet, to the effect that 10 million people protested against the war globally, speeding up mobilisation remarkably. It helped mobilisation in loose coalitions of small groups that organise very quickly, at the same time preserving the particularity of distinct groups in network forms of organisation. Moreover, the framing process (1b) was affected as well, since email list and web sites were used to mobilise, changing the framing of the message to suit the new medium. The language used to mobilise through the internet differs from traditional political discourse (for instance speeches or texts in traditional media) in that it can combine various technical media (video, satellite images, file-sharing) in a way that delivers on the one hand a richer message, but on the downside

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a sometimes hasty and crude, under-analytical political message. The political opportunity structure (1c) in this particular case can refer to alternative media (as we see below), but also to an opening of political space, or an opening of global politics to people that would not or could not get so involved before. In virtual terms, hacktivism (1d) was apparent in anti-war/pro-war hacking and a Virtual March on Washington which had an impact on the city's communication infrastructure.

2. The internet as a medium:

a. Analysing discourses (representations of the world, constructions of social identities and social relations), b. Control of information, level of censorship, alternative sources, c. Wolfsfeld\textsuperscript{87}: Political contest model among antagonists: the ability to initiate and control events, dominate political discourse, mobilise supporters, d. Media effects on policy (strategic, tactical, representational).

On the media front it is clear, that political discourse (2a) is constructed in the American mainstream media to mobilise support for the war as analysed above, since for example, more than two thirds of all sources in news programs were pro-war. Very important is also the issue of alternative sources and censorship (2b). Due to the embedded system, journalists having their work jeopardised for not being 'patriotic' enough, and the American media generally following the government line, Americans and the rest of the world went online to find alternative news, first hand witness accounts in emails and blogging. The result was the integration of the internet into media coverage and online material challenging official sources. The Wolfsfeld model (2c) is comfortably applied when we consider that the antiwar groups had the ability to initiate and control protest events and mobilise supporters, however were not as successful in dominating political discourse. The media effects on policy (2d) are more technical than anything else, meaning there was instant 24 hour access to the war and the pressure that inevitably puts on any administration, but no actual debate or impact on policy since the American media failed to question any decisions being taken by their government.

In conclusion, the internet has affected the mobilisational, framing and opportunity structures of contemporary social movements in ways that point to unprecedented speeds, diffusions of protests, altering framing and mobilisational structures with emphasis on networks of small coalitions, and more generally a globalisation of sociopolitical conflicts. It remains to be seen if this new medium is going to revolutionise global politics when internet users greatly exceed their present numbers.

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